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Historically, analytic philosophy has not been as close to psychiatry as the continental 
tradition. For instance, no analytic philosopher has produced a treatise as important 
and comprehensive as Karl Jaspers’s General Psychopathology (Jaspers 1963 [1913]), a 
work deeply infl uenced by phenomenology. Similarly, no analytic philosopher so far 
has critically engaged with the practice and history of psychiatry as Michel Foucault 
did in his Madness and Civilization (Foucault 1965 [1961]). As late as in the eight-
ies Anthony Quinton, by referring to analytic thinkers, was justifi ed to claim that it 
was a “remarkable fact that philosophers, in a sense the experts on rationality, should 
have taken so little interest in irrationality” (1985). Although at that time some rel-
evant research was done within the philosophy of  science (see for instance, Boorse 
1976 and Grünbaum 1984) and moral philosophy (see for instance, Margolis 1966 
and Glover 1970), philosophy of psychiatry could not be considered a mainstream 
discipline.
It is surely a fact that in recent years analytically oriented philosophers have acquired 
and sustained an interest for psychiatry. b is movement, that concerns prominently 
philosophy but has also had some impact on psychiatry and cognitive psychology, has 
been given a name, the “new philosophy of psychiatry” (Banner and b ornton 2007). 
Psychiatry, as other branches of medicine, involves a theoretical dimension concerned 
with the description, classifi cation and explanation of mental disorders and a practi-
cal dimension of intervention and treatment. b e “new philosophy of psychiatry” 
focuses on conceptual issues emerging from both dimensions, with contributions 
coming from philosophical disciplines such as philosophy of science, philosophy of 
mind and moral philosophy broadly understood. Examples of research outputs that 
address these issues are the volumes published within the International Perspective on 
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in interdisciplinary journals such as Mind & Language and Philosophy, Psychiatry and 
Psychology. 
A popular approach to the philosophy of psychiatry involves philosophers using par-
ticular empirical or theoretical results concerning mental illnesses to test their theo-
ries. For instance, some philosophers of mind have investigated how certain accounts 
of personal identity fare in relation to personality disorders (for an overview, see 
Radden 2004). Other philosophers, who are involved in the meta-ethical debate con-
cerning the nature of moral judgement and motivation, have referred to psychopaths’ 
specifi c impairments to investigate the faculties required for moral judgments (see 
Kennett 2010 and Maibom 2010 for critical surveys). b is general approach is surely 
commendable, given that it enables philosophers to inform and constrain their theo-
ries by means of careful consideration of hypotheses and data in psychiatry. However, 
we think that there is scope to promote a closer and genuinely mutual collaboration 
between philosophy and psychiatry. Not only can philosophers appeal to psychiatric 
cases as a source of empirical constraints on their theories, but in turn they can con-
tribute to research and clinical practice in psychiatry by exploring key concepts and 
suggesting new avenues for conceptually-sound empirical work (for a more detailed 
illustration and defence of this point, see Bortolotti 2010, 4-9).
b is collection focuses on conceptual issues that arise within the theoretical dimen-
sion of psychiatry. In particular, the invited contributions centre on the nature of 
psychiatric classifi cation and explanation by addressing important methodological 
issues. Two strategies are exemplifi ed here. Either the authors directly contribute to 
foundational issues in psychiatry concerning the nature of psychiatric classifi cation 
and explanation; or they provide a conceptual analysis that can play a role in develop-
ing adequate theories of specifi c psychiatric disorders. 
b e former approach is displayed in the papers that concern the notions of clas-
sifi cation, natural kind, and explanation in psychiatry by Helen Beebee and Nigel 
Sabbarton-Leary, Dominic Murphy, John McMillan and partly Tim b ornton. b ey 
substantially advance core debates about the nature of psychiatry. b e latter approach 
highlights the valuable role of conceptual analysis in the understanding of psychiatric 
disorders and in the development of satisfactory accounts of them, and it is adopted 
in the contributions by Doris McIlwain (on psychopathy), Hanna Pickard (on alien 
thought), and Tim b ornton (on delusions).
Let us consider the content of each contribution in more detail.
Helen Beebee and Nigel Sabbarton-Leary promote a methodological refl ection on 
the existing literature on natural kinds in psychiatry, by applying to the debate all the 
sophisticated tools of contemporary metaphysics. b ey observe that certain assump-
tions in philosophy of psychiatry, such as crude essentialism about natural kinds and 
the claim that social norms cannot play a role in identifying natural categories, have 
prevented progress and generated unnecessary polarization. As the question whether 
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myth, and whether it has genuine scientifi c status), providing a satisfactory answer to 
that question is fundamental. Beebee and Sabbarton-Leary helpfully compare kinds 
in psychiatry not just to kinds in physics, but also to kinds in sciences such as chem-
istry and biology. b ey illustrate three alternative conceptions of natural kinds - the 
conventional account, the Kripkean account and the ‘homeostatic property cluster’ 
account - and conclude that we should not rule out the possibility that categories in 
psychiatry are natural kinds in the latter sense. 
Dominic Murphy illustrates and examines the peculiar complexity of mental ill-
nesses. Two patients can be diagnosed with the same mental disorder although they 
might share very few symptoms. In addition, these symptoms might vary in time. 
Such complexity can be dealt with by diff erent ways of representing mental illnesses. 
Given that these representations should constitute the principal explananda for psy-
chiatry, deciding between them requires adjudicating between diff erent accounts of 
psychiatric explanation. Specifi cally, Murphy individuates two types of representa-
tions that he names the “zooming-out” and the “zooming-in” approach. Zooming-
out is based on the use of abstract models. Murphy articulates and defends an ac-
count of this descriptive and explanatory strategy.  Zooming-in, on the other hand, 
involves explaining in causal terms simpler components of complex mental illnesses. 
Murphy criticises this strategy as exemplifi ed in Bentall (2003).
John McMillan investigates what is “alive” and what is “dead” in Karl Jaspers’s meth-
odology for the study of mental disorders advanced in his General Psychopathology. 
Amongst the important and still valuable contributions to contemporary psychiatry, 
McMillan highlights Jaspers’s discussion of the distinction between causes and under-
standing of mental disorders, his classifi cation of psychopathologies, and his criticism 
to assumptions in certain neurological and psychodynamic approaches. However, he 
stresses certain fl aws in Jaspers’s empathic method for understanding mental disorders 
on the basis of the patients’ reports about their private and subjective mental life. Ac-
cording to McMillan, Jaspers assumes, and he should do so, that meanings of mental 
predicates should be publicly available. However, as shown by Wittgenstein, private 
subjective mental states cannot ground the publicity of meanings of the expressions 
used to describe them. b us, Jaspers’s empathic methodology is undermined.
Hanna Pickard, coming from the perspective of empirically-informed philosophy 
of mind, off ers fi ve desiderata for philosophical accounts of alien thought. Such ac-
counts should: (1) pay closer attention to the varied phenomenology of the patients’ 
reports and rely on a richer diet of clinical examples; (2) be informed and constrained 
by cutting-edge cognitive science (e.g., the two-factor theory of delusions); (3) be 
constrained and informed by cutting-edge philosophical theories of self-knowledge 
and mental ontology (such as the notions of ownership and authorship of thought 
on the bases of which Pickard claims that people with alien thought fail to endorse an 
introspected thought); (4) vindicate the continuum model of psychosis (Pickard sug-
gests that alien thought could be seen just as a more radical version of akrasia and this 
helps empathise with and understand people with that condition); and (5) encourage 
a critical attitude towards popular diagnostic labels. 
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spective of someone who engages in psychological research with conceptual rigour. 
According to McIlwain, the constellation of psychological features characterising 
psychopaths (among which, lack of empathy, manipulation of others, scarce reac-
tivity to threat and fear, strategic mental time travel) suggests that the biological 
underpinnings of psychopathy leave room for the contribution of developmental 
factors. Issues about the aetiology and the manifestations of psychopathy open up 
the question whether the condition is a psychiatric disorder or an extreme personality 
style. Psychopaths exhibit aff ective diffi  culties and may not tolerate inner states long 
enough to refl ect on them, which causes their own memories, feelings and impulses 
to become disconnected. What appears as behaviour that embodies an extreme form 
of hypocrisy is rather the behaviour of a fragmented, aff ected fl attened self.
Tim E ornton is interested both in explaining accurately the nature of particular 
psychiatric disorders and in addressing methodological issues concerning the philoso-
phy of psychiatry in general. His paper contains a preliminary investigation of the 
nature of explanation. He takes issue with the recent suggestion, by John Campbell 
(2008; 2009), that some causes of behaviour are legitimately described as mental 
even if they do not meet criteria of rationality, and thus rationality is not a require-
ment for explanation in psychological terms. Campbell relies on a sober Humean 
understanding of causal relations, coupled with an interventionist account along the 
lines of Woodward (2003). In response, b ornton argues that a qualifi ed notion of 
rationality, and thus a normative dimension, should be at the heart of psychiatric 
explanation. b is general point is applied to the problem of making sense of delu-
sions: for these mental states, b ornton invokes a form of understanding that is not 
exhausted by causal explanation and that can make certain beliefs and practices intel-
ligible “from the outside”.
We believe that the papers in this volume will vastly contribute to promoting and 
advancing the “new philosophy of psychiatry” as a mature and exciting fi eld in con-
temporary analytic philosophy. We would like to thank the Editorial board of this 
Journal for giving us the opportunity to edit this special issue, and we express our 
deepest gratitude to all the contributors for working at such high standards within a 
very tight time frame. 
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